Let Me Be Myself

"Tell me please would you one time
Let me be myself
So I can shine with my own light"

I've been thinking a lot about our sense of self lately. Perhaps because mine feels so... different right now. No, I'm not on any medications that would account for this change, but that didn't stop me from being intrigued by a recent paper in the journal Neuroethics called Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology, by Felicitas Kraemer.

Kraemer begins by extensively discussing Peter Kramer's 1993 book Listening to Prozac (which I own, but have not yet read). Kramer describes a woman who, by all accounts, was never particularly happy and outgoing, as experiencing such a positive change in personality on Prozac that she didn't want to stop taking it because "she is not herself anymore without it." She now identified with a 'true self' that hadn't emerged until she'd been medicated. "...Kramer described the process as one of a redefinition of the self" where "the socially competent and cheerful self that is prevalent under Prozac is declared as the 'real self,' whereas the less welcome, shy and depressed one, is not experienced as real anymore." The implication, of course, is that since the 'new' self conforms to a (socially-approved of) "better or even 'ideal' self", then that self must be a more authentic representation of the real person. The paradox, of course, is that since we typically define authenticity as a combination of naturalness of origin and consistency with the past, how can a sense of self arising from an "artificial enhancement device" like Prozac lead to a more authentic self?

Or, to reframe Kraemer's reframing of the question, is Prozac creating something that was never there and is thereby inauthentic, or is Prozac enabling us to access something that was always there, always possible, and which can thereby be deemed to be authentic? Is Prozac simply peeling back a slightly rotten top layer of the emotional onion, revealing something 'better' that has been there all along? What is the genuine article with respect to our emotions and the behaviors arising from them?

Is an emotion genuine because I feel it, or is it genuine because it is consistent with how I have previously felt and how I think that I should feel? Or is the difference between the two only worth debating if I'm unwilling to accept and integrate the new emotions into my sense of self? With respect to consenting adults who have unrestricted access to these technologies, you might leave it strictly up to the individual to decide what is or is not 'authentic'. But because many self-altering medications are prescribed to minors who may have barely had a chance to develop a sense of self on par with that of consenting adults, and because social pressure is the source of most of our ideas about what an acceptable sense of self is, the issue of authenticity is of broader concern.

To what degree do we owe it to a person to allow them to develop as naturally as possible? I have a friend whose child has been diagnosed with ADHD. The child's 'wild' behavior creates difficulties for the parents and teachers, but the child is boisterous, gregarious, and happy, and does not appear to be suffering. So far the parents have not medicated this child, but their doctor has put it out there as an option for the future. I wonder about whose needs/desires will ultimately take precedence in this situation. Will 'the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the one', or will the child be allowed to continue as his 'wild' happy self because that is who he is?

And when will the child be self-aware enough to realize that something may have been taken away from him if he were medicated? Kraemer claims to "support the more general, conceptual thesis that people do not experience artificial emotions when taking drugs of whatever kind," a thesis that I reject. I believe that it is possible to be self-aware enough to realize (simultaneously with the occurring emotion) when an emotional response is inconsistent with one's previous history of responses to similar circumstances, and that that inconsistency is enough to cause one to deem the emotion 'artificial' or 'inauthentic'. And forcing an inconsistent emotional response upon a person is a deep violation of the very essence of our experiencing, sentient selves.

Kraemer concludes (wrongly, IMHO) that the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' is only relevant with respect to the source or means by which the emotion is produced, and not with respect to how the emotion is experienced. (p. 55) Yet, ironically, Kraemer goes on to argue that an emotion can be claimed to be authentic "if the individuals experiencing it recognize their own feelings really as their own and identify with them." (p. 58) We seem to be disagreeing about the degree of equivalency between 'natural' and 'authentic', and between 'inauthentic' and 'artificial'...

It may very well be possible that a person can be unaware enough of the differences in felt emotions to appreciate which ones arise from the use of an artificial technology. Further, it's entirely possible that they just don't care about the inconsistency between the way they responded emotionally in the past and the way they are currently responding. But this should not be considered to be a reasonable assumption with respect to all people, and the law should be designed to protect those who notice a difference and are bothered by it.

It's entirely possible that one's sense of self will 'evolve' over time to accommodate the new set of emotional responses. It's even possible that this new sense of self will be appreciated and deemed qualitatively better than the flawed, old self that experienced emotions or had responses that were 'not desirable'. But it's my belief that such changes should never be forced upon anyone, either by the law or by social pressure. (Kraemer's article includes illustrations from Kramer's book of people who were very bothered by discrepancy between how they felt and how they knew they should feel.)

Our social norms do include a historical appreciation and respect for authenticity, but how will this respect sustain itself (or not) in the face of increasingly easier (and more radical) ways to modify oneself? Kraemer critically cites transhumanist Nick Bostrom's work as an overly simplistic view of how easy making 'emotional improvements' would be. She points out that "[c]hanging our emotional  life means changing our cultural and epistemic norms." Perhaps more importantly though, judgments about the authenticity of emotions reside first and foremost with the subjective experiencer, determined by the degree to which they are or are not able to integrate the emotional changes into their existing sense of self. And it is inconsistency that erodes our sense of self. As Kraemer puts it, "[o]ur emotions depend on each other in a fragile nexus that can easily be destroyed by uncontrolled manipulation." And without a strong, consistent sense of self, who are we?