"Tell me please would you one time
Let me be myself
So I can shine with my own light"
I've been thinking a lot about our sense of self lately. Perhaps because mine feels so... different right now. No, I'm not on any medications that would account for this change, but that didn't stop me from being intrigued by a recent paper in the journal Neuroethics called Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology, by Felicitas Kraemer.
Kraemer begins by extensively discussing Peter Kramer's 1993 book Listening to Prozac (which I own, but have not yet read). Kramer describes a woman who, by all accounts, was never particularly happy and outgoing, as experiencing such a positive change in personality on Prozac that she didn't want to stop taking it because "she is not herself anymore without it." She now identified with a 'true self' that hadn't emerged until she'd been medicated. "...Kramer described the process as one of a redefinition of the self" where "the socially competent and cheerful self that is prevalent under Prozac is declared as the 'real self,' whereas the less welcome, shy and depressed one, is not experienced as real anymore." The implication, of course, is that since the 'new' self conforms to a (socially-approved of) "better or even 'ideal' self", then that self must be a more authentic representation of the real person. The paradox, of course, is that since we typically define authenticity as a combination of naturalness of origin and consistency with the past, how can a sense of self arising from an "artificial enhancement device" like Prozac lead to a more authentic self?
Or, to reframe Kraemer's reframing of the question, is Prozac creating something that was never there and is thereby inauthentic, or is Prozac enabling us to access something that was always there, always possible, and which can thereby be deemed to be authentic? Is Prozac simply peeling back a slightly rotten top layer of the emotional onion, revealing something 'better' that has been there all along? What is the genuine article with respect to our emotions and the behaviors arising from them?
Is an emotion genuine because I feel it, or is it genuine because it is consistent with how I have previously felt and how I think that I should feel? Or is the difference between the two only worth debating if I'm unwilling to accept and integrate the new emotions into my sense of self? With respect to consenting adults who have unrestricted access to these technologies, you might leave it strictly up to the individual to decide what is or is not 'authentic'. But because many self-altering medications are prescribed to minors who may have barely had a chance to develop a sense of self on par with that of consenting adults, and because social pressure is the source of most of our ideas about what an acceptable sense of self is, the issue of authenticity is of broader concern.
To what degree do we owe it to a person to allow them to develop as naturally as possible? I have a friend whose child has been diagnosed with ADHD. The child's 'wild' behavior creates difficulties for the parents and teachers, but the child is boisterous, gregarious, and happy, and does not appear to be suffering. So far the parents have not medicated this child, but their doctor has put it out there as an option for the future. I wonder about whose needs/desires will ultimately take precedence in this situation. Will 'the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the one', or will the child be allowed to continue as his 'wild' happy self because that is who he is?
And when will the child be self-aware enough to realize that something may have been taken away from him if he were medicated? Kraemer claims to "support the more general, conceptual thesis that people do not experience artificial emotions when taking drugs of whatever kind," a thesis that I reject. I believe that it is possible to be self-aware enough to realize (simultaneously with the occurring emotion) when an emotional response is inconsistent with one's previous history of responses to similar circumstances, and that that inconsistency is enough to cause one to deem the emotion 'artificial' or 'inauthentic'. And forcing an inconsistent emotional response upon a person is a deep violation of the very essence of our experiencing, sentient selves.
Kraemer concludes (wrongly, IMHO) that the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' is only relevant with respect to the source or means by which the emotion is produced, and not with respect to how the emotion is experienced. (p. 55) Yet, ironically, Kraemer goes on to argue that an emotion can be claimed to be authentic "if the individuals experiencing it recognize their own feelings really as their own and identify with them." (p. 58) We seem to be disagreeing about the degree of equivalency between 'natural' and 'authentic', and between 'inauthentic' and 'artificial'...
It may very well be possible that a person can be unaware enough of the differences in felt emotions to appreciate which ones arise from the use of an artificial technology. Further, it's entirely possible that they just don't care about the inconsistency between the way they responded emotionally in the past and the way they are currently responding. But this should not be considered to be a reasonable assumption with respect to all people, and the law should be designed to protect those who notice a difference and are bothered by it.
It's entirely possible that one's sense of self will 'evolve' over time to accommodate the new set of emotional responses. It's even possible that this new sense of self will be appreciated and deemed qualitatively better than the flawed, old self that experienced emotions or had responses that were 'not desirable'. But it's my belief that such changes should never be forced upon anyone, either by the law or by social pressure. (Kraemer's article includes illustrations from Kramer's book of people who were very bothered by discrepancy between how they felt and how they knew they should feel.)
Our social norms do include a historical appreciation and respect for authenticity, but how will this respect sustain itself (or not) in the face of increasingly easier (and more radical) ways to modify oneself? Kraemer critically cites transhumanist Nick Bostrom's work as an overly simplistic view of how easy making 'emotional improvements' would be. She points out that "[c]hanging our emotional life means changing our cultural and epistemic norms." Perhaps more importantly though, judgments about the authenticity of emotions reside first and foremost with the subjective experiencer, determined by the degree to which they are or are not able to integrate the emotional changes into their existing sense of self. And it is inconsistency that erodes our sense of self. As Kraemer puts it, "[o]ur emotions depend on each other in a fragile nexus that can easily be destroyed by uncontrolled manipulation." And without a strong, consistent sense of self, who are we?
Showing posts with label free to be. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free to be. Show all posts
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Saturday, March 19, 2011
Free To Be... Limitless
"I don't have delusions of grandeur. I have an actual recipe for grandeur."
The question that never comes up in the movie Limitless? Is it okay to take NZT?
Limitless follows one man's experience with an illicitly-obtained drug called NZT. Though the term is never used in the film, NZT is described (via the portrayal of its effects) as a cognitive enhancer. The actual mechanism(s) of NZT are never explained, and its ability to enhance memory and processing capability are largely portrayed as wonderful. Withdrawal from the drug is a bitch, of course. And then there was that 18-hour memory gap, during which the protagonist may or may not have committed a murder... But you leave the movie with a generally-positive view of cognitive enhancers. No one in the movie ever wonders if it's fair to take NZT. (And they only briefly wonder if it's safe to take NZT.)
Cognitive enhancers - a.k.a. smart pills, neuroenhancers, or study drugs - are getting attention again. Recently the Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism released a report that found, among other things, that "[o]verall use of Adderall is increasing on campuses, and the drug is regularly abused by those with or without a prescription." (q) It's not entirely clear what motivated the WCIJ study, though the findings focused on the illegality involved in obtaining the drug, and on the medical dangers of abusing the drug.
Others have raised the issue of fairness though, likening the use of cognitive enhancers to "the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport" saying that "[t]heir use could lead to problems of coercion, where there is pressure on individuals to take the drugs even if they do not wish to. Similarly, if such drugs were available to only a proportion of competitors, they could be seen as giving an unfair advantage, or to be a form of cheating." (q) (I said something similar awhile back.)
At least one university has now labeled the "misuse" of these types of drugs as 'cheating', raising the question of whether or not a ban on "brain boosting drugs" is a good idea. Lamkin attempts to deflect attention away from the drugs, and onto the method and purpose of higher education. "If our goal is to promote students' engagement in education, we should realign student incentives with the appreciation of education's internal benefits, so that students are not rewarded for taking shortcuts." That's great, in theory. However, even if universities and colleges are able to "realign" themselves so as to render the use of smart drugs undesirable, it simply pushes the problem of smart drugs into the arena of the workplace.
It's in the workplace where the protagonist (Eddie Morra) of Limitless meets with success as a result of his use of NZT. He finishes his book in 4 days, makes obscene amounts of money as a day trader, and catches the eye of a wealthy mogul who offers him the opportunity to use his talents in exchange for even more-obscene amounts of money. **SPOILER ALERT** By the end of the movie, Eddie has achieved a level of material success that cannot be taken away from him. His ability also allowed him to make the money that 'bought' him his continued freedom, via the efforts of a top defense attorney, after the missing 18 hours come back to haunt him. He even used his money to engineer a way to wean himself off the drug, avoiding insanity and death while retaining the cognitive enhancements permanently. In short, he won. (Sorry, Kyle. If anything, this movie is effectively an advertisement for cognitive enhancers.)
In arguing for societal acceptance of cognitive enhancement, two assumptions have been made. One, that such drugs will eventually be risk-free, and two, that they will eventually be available to everyone. (Neither assumption is true today.) But, to my mind, the bigger ethical issue is still the one that I addressed over a year ago... How do you argue for the cognitive liberty of the individual when the exercise of that liberty may result in a decrease in liberty for those who follow? This presupposes that cosmetic neurology would restrict rather than broaden the range of what we accept as 'normal'. (Think about a neurological version of The Stepford Wives...)
If there is an argument to be made against enhancement technology, it might very well be that redefining what is possible will also redefine what is acceptable, even tolerable. And consequently, individual liberty may be lost rather than gained.
The question that never comes up in the movie Limitless? Is it okay to take NZT?
Limitless follows one man's experience with an illicitly-obtained drug called NZT. Though the term is never used in the film, NZT is described (via the portrayal of its effects) as a cognitive enhancer. The actual mechanism(s) of NZT are never explained, and its ability to enhance memory and processing capability are largely portrayed as wonderful. Withdrawal from the drug is a bitch, of course. And then there was that 18-hour memory gap, during which the protagonist may or may not have committed a murder... But you leave the movie with a generally-positive view of cognitive enhancers. No one in the movie ever wonders if it's fair to take NZT. (And they only briefly wonder if it's safe to take NZT.)
Cognitive enhancers - a.k.a. smart pills, neuroenhancers, or study drugs - are getting attention again. Recently the Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism released a report that found, among other things, that "[o]verall use of Adderall is increasing on campuses, and the drug is regularly abused by those with or without a prescription." (q) It's not entirely clear what motivated the WCIJ study, though the findings focused on the illegality involved in obtaining the drug, and on the medical dangers of abusing the drug.
Others have raised the issue of fairness though, likening the use of cognitive enhancers to "the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport" saying that "[t]heir use could lead to problems of coercion, where there is pressure on individuals to take the drugs even if they do not wish to. Similarly, if such drugs were available to only a proportion of competitors, they could be seen as giving an unfair advantage, or to be a form of cheating." (q) (I said something similar awhile back.)
At least one university has now labeled the "misuse" of these types of drugs as 'cheating', raising the question of whether or not a ban on "brain boosting drugs" is a good idea. Lamkin attempts to deflect attention away from the drugs, and onto the method and purpose of higher education. "If our goal is to promote students' engagement in education, we should realign student incentives with the appreciation of education's internal benefits, so that students are not rewarded for taking shortcuts." That's great, in theory. However, even if universities and colleges are able to "realign" themselves so as to render the use of smart drugs undesirable, it simply pushes the problem of smart drugs into the arena of the workplace.
It's in the workplace where the protagonist (Eddie Morra) of Limitless meets with success as a result of his use of NZT. He finishes his book in 4 days, makes obscene amounts of money as a day trader, and catches the eye of a wealthy mogul who offers him the opportunity to use his talents in exchange for even more-obscene amounts of money. **SPOILER ALERT** By the end of the movie, Eddie has achieved a level of material success that cannot be taken away from him. His ability also allowed him to make the money that 'bought' him his continued freedom, via the efforts of a top defense attorney, after the missing 18 hours come back to haunt him. He even used his money to engineer a way to wean himself off the drug, avoiding insanity and death while retaining the cognitive enhancements permanently. In short, he won. (Sorry, Kyle. If anything, this movie is effectively an advertisement for cognitive enhancers.)
In arguing for societal acceptance of cognitive enhancement, two assumptions have been made. One, that such drugs will eventually be risk-free, and two, that they will eventually be available to everyone. (Neither assumption is true today.) But, to my mind, the bigger ethical issue is still the one that I addressed over a year ago... How do you argue for the cognitive liberty of the individual when the exercise of that liberty may result in a decrease in liberty for those who follow? This presupposes that cosmetic neurology would restrict rather than broaden the range of what we accept as 'normal'. (Think about a neurological version of The Stepford Wives...)
If there is an argument to be made against enhancement technology, it might very well be that redefining what is possible will also redefine what is acceptable, even tolerable. And consequently, individual liberty may be lost rather than gained.
Monday, March 14, 2011
Free To Be... Smarter Than You
"To clothe the fiery thought
in simple words succeeds,
For still the craft of genius is
To mask a king in weeds."
In honor of Einstein's birthday, I've decided to devote some more blog space to the issue of neurodiversity.
True story: Two employees were internal applicants for the same position. Neither employee was given the position, but for different reasons. Employee 1 was told that she wasn't always 'nice enough' about being smarter than some of the other employees who had been with the company much longer than she had. Employee 2 was told that he wasn't being hired for the position because, despite working in the department for several years, he hadn't already been trained to do the things that the position required. The company was not willing to increase their investment in either candidate, and one might argue that the issue in play in both cases was an unwillingness to tolerate/foster an increased neurodiversity among coworkers. (Of course such a statement was never made openly, but it was agreed that she 'was too abrasive' and he 'was a little slow'.) The end result was that both employees were forced to do essentially the same job for which they had applied, but with significantly less compensation than new hires to the same position.
Now, one employee had a medical diagnosis that falls squarely under the purview of 'neurodiversity' and for which coworkers expressed a certain sympathy. The other had to endure rude taunts and comments. One was given full leeway of expression; the other was expected to stifle whatever made others uncomfortable. One employee was much less likely to object to receiving significantly less compensation, and so was tolerated; the other was simply 'encouraged' to leave.
Discrimination: "The process by which two stimuli differing in some aspect are responded to differently."
Discrimination: "unequal treatment of persons, for a reason which has nothing to do with legal rights or ability. Federal and state laws prohibit discrimination in employment, availability of housing, rates of pay, right to promotion, educational opportunity, civil rights, and use of facilities based on race, nationality, creed, color, age, sex, or sexual orientation." (q) (my emphasis)
So here's your thought question for the day... Were either of these employees discriminated against, and if so, in what way? Or, to rephrase the question, which actions toward/against the employees were acceptable, and why?
in simple words succeeds,
For still the craft of genius is
To mask a king in weeds."
In honor of Einstein's birthday, I've decided to devote some more blog space to the issue of neurodiversity.
True story: Two employees were internal applicants for the same position. Neither employee was given the position, but for different reasons. Employee 1 was told that she wasn't always 'nice enough' about being smarter than some of the other employees who had been with the company much longer than she had. Employee 2 was told that he wasn't being hired for the position because, despite working in the department for several years, he hadn't already been trained to do the things that the position required. The company was not willing to increase their investment in either candidate, and one might argue that the issue in play in both cases was an unwillingness to tolerate/foster an increased neurodiversity among coworkers. (Of course such a statement was never made openly, but it was agreed that she 'was too abrasive' and he 'was a little slow'.) The end result was that both employees were forced to do essentially the same job for which they had applied, but with significantly less compensation than new hires to the same position.
Now, one employee had a medical diagnosis that falls squarely under the purview of 'neurodiversity' and for which coworkers expressed a certain sympathy. The other had to endure rude taunts and comments. One was given full leeway of expression; the other was expected to stifle whatever made others uncomfortable. One employee was much less likely to object to receiving significantly less compensation, and so was tolerated; the other was simply 'encouraged' to leave.
Discrimination: "The process by which two stimuli differing in some aspect are responded to differently."
Discrimination: "unequal treatment of persons, for a reason which has nothing to do with legal rights or ability. Federal and state laws prohibit discrimination in employment, availability of housing, rates of pay, right to promotion, educational opportunity, civil rights, and use of facilities based on race, nationality, creed, color, age, sex, or sexual orientation." (q) (my emphasis)
So here's your thought question for the day... Were either of these employees discriminated against, and if so, in what way? Or, to rephrase the question, which actions toward/against the employees were acceptable, and why?
Monday, October 18, 2010
Free To Be... Disabled?
"...by intentionally bringing a child into the world who has a disability, it significantly violates the child’s right to an open future."
"The capacity to empathize with others is undeniably a revered characteristic in our society." (q)
"But if we want to continue to have exceptional, creative geniuses, those pathological traits are an absolute necessity."
Ask and ye shall receive.
For a few weeks now, I've been chewing on the issue raised by this post: Is it morally correct to select for a genetic trait that most people consider to be a disability? The post uses the example of non-syndromic, autosomal recessive deafness, but also touches on the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In both cases, advocacy movements have formed to promote (among other things) the right to intentionally reproduce atypical/disabled offspring. In the case of non-syndromic, autosomal recessive deafness, preimplantation genetic diagnosis makes this possible (though not yet with ASD).
In some more-recent, unrelated web surfing, I came across the idea that people with Asperger's syndrome actually had higher levels of (affective) empathy than neurotypical (NT) controls. (Additional web surfing brought me to numerous instances of aspies affirming this claim.) That brought me right back to this section from Buchman's post... "This is because of the “dual nature” of ASD, that is, while these individuals may have difficulties negotiating the social world and possess other traits that might be regarded as disabling, some individuals with ASD tend to be intellectually gifted and others even possess savant-like qualities. Indeed, Ludwig Wittgenstein, arguably one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, was believed to have had Asperger syndrome. Since Wittgenstein’s (and others) intellectual giftedness is inseparable from other traits causing disability, then obliging to not bring such individuals into the world would be a loss to society as a whole. This latter dilemma is what Gillett refers to as the unwitting sacrifice problem: the ethical challenges that arise when selecting for disabilities that can cause suffering in the individual, but can also be advantageous to both individuals and society. Gillett notices that, in selecting for disability, these individuals are born as unwitting sacrifices to society’s or parent’s desire for certain genetic traits that are deemed valuable. Ought we permit somebody to be an unwitting sacrifice?" (My emphasis.) Does increased empathic sensitivity (and its presumable decrease in the desire to cause suffering in others) add to the balance to 'justify' selecting for individuals with Asperger syndrome, and how is that weighed against the suffering of the individuals involved?
[SIDE NOTE: Creativity seems to be another area where the advantage/disadvantage line might get a little blurry.]
Historically, people have been mostly free to mate with whomever they choose, with all the incumbent hopes of capturing a portion of something from that person in the resultant offspring. The genius, the athletic prowess, the personality, or the simple outward aesthetic. In this respect, the child was subject to the whims of the parents. Any damage or disadvantage to the child as a result of that particular genetic pairing may have been deemed unfortunate, but the child could not hold the parents to account for his/her misfortunes. Obviously, genetic testing technology changes that critical portion of the relationship between parent and child. Before 'genetic awareness', a parent could not be held responsible for the genetic 'condition' of the child. A child could not blame the parents for wilfully inflicting a genetic disadvantage upon him/her, or for failing to give him/her any specific genetic advantage. After 'genetic awareness', a parent has a new set of choices to (possibly) regret later, and a child has a new criterion by which to judge his/her parents. I can't help but wonder how the parent-child relationship will change as the parent's ability to design the child increases.
But what finally prompted me to write this post was the following thought...
We currently know quite a bit about what is needed to successfully nurture a child, yet we do next to nothing to regulate the environment, stimulation, etc. that a parent must provide for their child. Why should we presume any greater responsibility in regulating how parents choose to 'nature' their child? If parents are free to make poor choices with regards to the nurturing of their children, are they equally free to make poor choices in the 'naturing' of their children? (And at what point do 'differing values' become 'poor choices'?) How have adult children responded to the knowledge that their parents (knowingly) did not give them every nurtural advantage, and what might this tell us about how children will react to being given a natural (genetic) disadvantage?
[This is not intended to be a definitive opinion on the topic of genetic selection, but rather a small contribution to a larger, longer discussion.]
"The capacity to empathize with others is undeniably a revered characteristic in our society." (q)
"But if we want to continue to have exceptional, creative geniuses, those pathological traits are an absolute necessity."
Ask and ye shall receive.
For a few weeks now, I've been chewing on the issue raised by this post: Is it morally correct to select for a genetic trait that most people consider to be a disability? The post uses the example of non-syndromic, autosomal recessive deafness, but also touches on the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In both cases, advocacy movements have formed to promote (among other things) the right to intentionally reproduce atypical/disabled offspring. In the case of non-syndromic, autosomal recessive deafness, preimplantation genetic diagnosis makes this possible (though not yet with ASD).
In some more-recent, unrelated web surfing, I came across the idea that people with Asperger's syndrome actually had higher levels of (affective) empathy than neurotypical (NT) controls. (Additional web surfing brought me to numerous instances of aspies affirming this claim.) That brought me right back to this section from Buchman's post... "This is because of the “dual nature” of ASD, that is, while these individuals may have difficulties negotiating the social world and possess other traits that might be regarded as disabling, some individuals with ASD tend to be intellectually gifted and others even possess savant-like qualities. Indeed, Ludwig Wittgenstein, arguably one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, was believed to have had Asperger syndrome. Since Wittgenstein’s (and others) intellectual giftedness is inseparable from other traits causing disability, then obliging to not bring such individuals into the world would be a loss to society as a whole. This latter dilemma is what Gillett refers to as the unwitting sacrifice problem: the ethical challenges that arise when selecting for disabilities that can cause suffering in the individual, but can also be advantageous to both individuals and society. Gillett notices that, in selecting for disability, these individuals are born as unwitting sacrifices to society’s or parent’s desire for certain genetic traits that are deemed valuable. Ought we permit somebody to be an unwitting sacrifice?" (My emphasis.) Does increased empathic sensitivity (and its presumable decrease in the desire to cause suffering in others) add to the balance to 'justify' selecting for individuals with Asperger syndrome, and how is that weighed against the suffering of the individuals involved?
[SIDE NOTE: Creativity seems to be another area where the advantage/disadvantage line might get a little blurry.]
Historically, people have been mostly free to mate with whomever they choose, with all the incumbent hopes of capturing a portion of something from that person in the resultant offspring. The genius, the athletic prowess, the personality, or the simple outward aesthetic. In this respect, the child was subject to the whims of the parents. Any damage or disadvantage to the child as a result of that particular genetic pairing may have been deemed unfortunate, but the child could not hold the parents to account for his/her misfortunes. Obviously, genetic testing technology changes that critical portion of the relationship between parent and child. Before 'genetic awareness', a parent could not be held responsible for the genetic 'condition' of the child. A child could not blame the parents for wilfully inflicting a genetic disadvantage upon him/her, or for failing to give him/her any specific genetic advantage. After 'genetic awareness', a parent has a new set of choices to (possibly) regret later, and a child has a new criterion by which to judge his/her parents. I can't help but wonder how the parent-child relationship will change as the parent's ability to design the child increases.
But what finally prompted me to write this post was the following thought...
We currently know quite a bit about what is needed to successfully nurture a child, yet we do next to nothing to regulate the environment, stimulation, etc. that a parent must provide for their child. Why should we presume any greater responsibility in regulating how parents choose to 'nature' their child? If parents are free to make poor choices with regards to the nurturing of their children, are they equally free to make poor choices in the 'naturing' of their children? (And at what point do 'differing values' become 'poor choices'?) How have adult children responded to the knowledge that their parents (knowingly) did not give them every nurtural advantage, and what might this tell us about how children will react to being given a natural (genetic) disadvantage?
[This is not intended to be a definitive opinion on the topic of genetic selection, but rather a small contribution to a larger, longer discussion.]
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Future Most Probable
"The empires of the future are the empires of the mind."
When I think about the future, I see a complicated web. Attempting to isolate one problem or issue to discuss is difficult, but here goes...
A couple weeks ago I had occasion to be in the pharmacy section of a large drugstore chain on a busy Saturday. And the pharmacy was handing out prescription after prescription - both at the counter and at the drive-thru. Prescriptions frequently came with verbal admonitions ('warnings') about possible side-effects. Several things occurred to me in those minutes...
1) Culturally, we have a 'there's an app for that' approach to illness, rather than a holistic approach to health.
2) Belief in the power/safety of the app is more important than understanding the actual workings of the app.
3) Our individual willingness to invoke an app is generally not equalled by our individual ability/willingness to measure its effects or critically examine the outcome.
Pause for a story...
We'll call our protagonist Lady. Lady was experiencing episodes of extreme emotion (sadness) in her life. She knew that these episodes were 1) out of character for her, and 2) did not correlate to any easily-identifiable psychological triggers. She had done a fairly-thorough assessment of her life to try to determine if there was in fact something psychological going on. Was she unhappy with her job? (No.) Was she experiencing a mid-life crisis? (No. She was mostly content with what she had.) Having talked to Lady extensively during this time, I was impressed by the depth of her introspection.
Eventually Lady began to look for a chemical explanation for these episodes. Were they tied to her menstrual cycle or birth control? (No.) Perhaps something she was eating? Through a combination of internet research and an elimination diet, she was able to isolate Chemical X as the causal agent. Eliminating this chemical from her diet also eliminated the episodes of extreme emotions. Reintroducing the chemical brought them back. Lady 1) suffered unnecessarily for a period of time, but 2) was able, through introspection and rational analysis, eliminate the source of her suffering.
This story is representative of much of what I see (and hope for) in the near future. I see a continuing growth in the realization that simply because something is available does not mean that it is safe. I see our increased reliance on pharmaceuticals and artificial chemicals bringing us to a crisis point with respect to the issue of Safety, and also with respect to the issue of Identity.
To some degree these two issues are intertwined, and there very well may be an Event in the near future that captures our collective attention and highlights this. (It's amazing to me that we still have as high a tolerance/acceptance for pharmaceutical intervention as we do, given all the stories about ineffectiveness and unintended side-effects that have surfaced.) But it is not difficult to predict that as more people gain more experience with a wider range of pharmaceuticals/chemicals and their psychological consequences, the issue of Identity will be brought to the forefront of our collective consciousness. Questions like What am I if a drug can make me do/feel this? will demand answers as never before.
The nature of human-ness, consciousness, and our sense of identity will be topics of increasing popular interest. When I think about where people will turn for the answers to these questions, I see no ready area of information. The word 'spirituality' comes to mind, but I would like to see that word replaced by something that indicates an informed, supportive environment that can facilitate introspection and self-awareness, as well as provide knowledge (scientific knowledge) about the phenomenology of consciousness. This does not currently occur in our educational system, nor in most systems of religious instruction. It is something that must be sought out and/or developed by the individual; it is not currently a part of our societal awareness. I hope that this will change, and there are promising indications that this can happen.
I predict that we will also need to increase the scope and breadth of our collective dialogue as to our responsibilities to the next generation. To what degree do they deserve (and can we impose on them) modification without representation? Several months ago I sent a letter to the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, asking (among other things) about the status of their organization. It seems to me that their public activities (publishing, etc.) have fallen off quite a bit since the mid-2000's. I still have not received a reply. This disturbs me because I think that we are only beginning to see the complexity of the issues that will arise as neurological modification becomes more prevalent.
I should take a minute to point out my own biases in this area. I am generally hyper-aware of the cognitive effects of drugs in my system. I can distinguish and describe the cognitive effects of ibuprofen and acetaminophen, even though neither drug is intended to produce them. I came of age during the height of the 'war on drugs', and that may have predisposed me to have a negative or cautionary view of pharmaceutical intervention. (It's a possible bias; I acknowledge it.) I have a background in biology and an appreciation of the complex role that a single chemical can play within a living system. Perhaps this is why I have reservations about casually introducing a chemical into that system, especially if all of its potential effects are not know up front.
So perhaps I am projecting my own concerns into my vision of the future. Or perhaps there really will be an increasing collective movement towards understanding the conscious experience that we call 'human'. Perhaps we will take up the following questions together... Who are we when our Identity - our behaviors and the way we process information - has been visibly altered? When our conscious continuity with the past is significantly disrupted by artificial means - when we are no longer predictable in the same way as we were before - how responsible are we for those changes and the resulting actions? What responsibility do we bear to others who have lost their much of their Identity to something like Alzheimer's? Upon who, and why, and how, can we inflict attempts to modify Identity for the better, or to serve our own ends?
It's easy to tout individual responsibility (and I am very proud of Lady for the way she approached and took control of her own well-being), but this ignores the issues surrounding those who are dependent on us and who cannot make informed decisions for themselves. And it ignores the ethics of exercising power over others because we feel justified in doing so.
I guess it's pretty clear by now that I see this as one of the most pressing and challenging philosophical and ethical issue that we face in the near future. I am happy to see conferences attempting to address these issues. (I'll be at this one, and I plan to blog about it.) But so much of the thinking on these issues remains isolated within the academic/intellectual realm. So much of what is in the larger sphere - what the general public is exposed to - seems to be a reinforcement of the 'there's an app for that' mentality. Selling the app, and convincing us that we need it: these are the media images that surround us.
The lack of general knowledge and appreciation for biological complexity, combined with easy access to pharmaceuticals, is beginning to be socially-problematic, yet we have no targeted approach for educating children (or adults) about these issues. (Our Fair State only recently OK'd teaching birth control in sex education classes. I have never understood how perpetuating ignorance solves a problem, but that's a topic for another post...) It's easy to say that education is the answer, but I believe that the answer is going to be whatever facilitates an appreciation for the fragility and malleability of consciousness and identity. We will need to socially reinforce the idea that integrity of mind is sacrosanct. How exactly this should be accomplished, I do not know (though I have some ideas), but I do see it as the most-probable philosophical and ethical crisis point for which humanists and transhumanists should be preparing.
When I think about the future, I see a complicated web. Attempting to isolate one problem or issue to discuss is difficult, but here goes...
A couple weeks ago I had occasion to be in the pharmacy section of a large drugstore chain on a busy Saturday. And the pharmacy was handing out prescription after prescription - both at the counter and at the drive-thru. Prescriptions frequently came with verbal admonitions ('warnings') about possible side-effects. Several things occurred to me in those minutes...
1) Culturally, we have a 'there's an app for that' approach to illness, rather than a holistic approach to health.
2) Belief in the power/safety of the app is more important than understanding the actual workings of the app.
3) Our individual willingness to invoke an app is generally not equalled by our individual ability/willingness to measure its effects or critically examine the outcome.
Pause for a story...
We'll call our protagonist Lady. Lady was experiencing episodes of extreme emotion (sadness) in her life. She knew that these episodes were 1) out of character for her, and 2) did not correlate to any easily-identifiable psychological triggers. She had done a fairly-thorough assessment of her life to try to determine if there was in fact something psychological going on. Was she unhappy with her job? (No.) Was she experiencing a mid-life crisis? (No. She was mostly content with what she had.) Having talked to Lady extensively during this time, I was impressed by the depth of her introspection.
Eventually Lady began to look for a chemical explanation for these episodes. Were they tied to her menstrual cycle or birth control? (No.) Perhaps something she was eating? Through a combination of internet research and an elimination diet, she was able to isolate Chemical X as the causal agent. Eliminating this chemical from her diet also eliminated the episodes of extreme emotions. Reintroducing the chemical brought them back. Lady 1) suffered unnecessarily for a period of time, but 2) was able, through introspection and rational analysis, eliminate the source of her suffering.
This story is representative of much of what I see (and hope for) in the near future. I see a continuing growth in the realization that simply because something is available does not mean that it is safe. I see our increased reliance on pharmaceuticals and artificial chemicals bringing us to a crisis point with respect to the issue of Safety, and also with respect to the issue of Identity.
To some degree these two issues are intertwined, and there very well may be an Event in the near future that captures our collective attention and highlights this. (It's amazing to me that we still have as high a tolerance/acceptance for pharmaceutical intervention as we do, given all the stories about ineffectiveness and unintended side-effects that have surfaced.) But it is not difficult to predict that as more people gain more experience with a wider range of pharmaceuticals/chemicals and their psychological consequences, the issue of Identity will be brought to the forefront of our collective consciousness. Questions like What am I if a drug can make me do/feel this? will demand answers as never before.
The nature of human-ness, consciousness, and our sense of identity will be topics of increasing popular interest. When I think about where people will turn for the answers to these questions, I see no ready area of information. The word 'spirituality' comes to mind, but I would like to see that word replaced by something that indicates an informed, supportive environment that can facilitate introspection and self-awareness, as well as provide knowledge (scientific knowledge) about the phenomenology of consciousness. This does not currently occur in our educational system, nor in most systems of religious instruction. It is something that must be sought out and/or developed by the individual; it is not currently a part of our societal awareness. I hope that this will change, and there are promising indications that this can happen.
I predict that we will also need to increase the scope and breadth of our collective dialogue as to our responsibilities to the next generation. To what degree do they deserve (and can we impose on them) modification without representation? Several months ago I sent a letter to the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics, asking (among other things) about the status of their organization. It seems to me that their public activities (publishing, etc.) have fallen off quite a bit since the mid-2000's. I still have not received a reply. This disturbs me because I think that we are only beginning to see the complexity of the issues that will arise as neurological modification becomes more prevalent.
I should take a minute to point out my own biases in this area. I am generally hyper-aware of the cognitive effects of drugs in my system. I can distinguish and describe the cognitive effects of ibuprofen and acetaminophen, even though neither drug is intended to produce them. I came of age during the height of the 'war on drugs', and that may have predisposed me to have a negative or cautionary view of pharmaceutical intervention. (It's a possible bias; I acknowledge it.) I have a background in biology and an appreciation of the complex role that a single chemical can play within a living system. Perhaps this is why I have reservations about casually introducing a chemical into that system, especially if all of its potential effects are not know up front.
So perhaps I am projecting my own concerns into my vision of the future. Or perhaps there really will be an increasing collective movement towards understanding the conscious experience that we call 'human'. Perhaps we will take up the following questions together... Who are we when our Identity - our behaviors and the way we process information - has been visibly altered? When our conscious continuity with the past is significantly disrupted by artificial means - when we are no longer predictable in the same way as we were before - how responsible are we for those changes and the resulting actions? What responsibility do we bear to others who have lost their much of their Identity to something like Alzheimer's? Upon who, and why, and how, can we inflict attempts to modify Identity for the better, or to serve our own ends?
It's easy to tout individual responsibility (and I am very proud of Lady for the way she approached and took control of her own well-being), but this ignores the issues surrounding those who are dependent on us and who cannot make informed decisions for themselves. And it ignores the ethics of exercising power over others because we feel justified in doing so.
I guess it's pretty clear by now that I see this as one of the most pressing and challenging philosophical and ethical issue that we face in the near future. I am happy to see conferences attempting to address these issues. (I'll be at this one, and I plan to blog about it.) But so much of the thinking on these issues remains isolated within the academic/intellectual realm. So much of what is in the larger sphere - what the general public is exposed to - seems to be a reinforcement of the 'there's an app for that' mentality. Selling the app, and convincing us that we need it: these are the media images that surround us.
The lack of general knowledge and appreciation for biological complexity, combined with easy access to pharmaceuticals, is beginning to be socially-problematic, yet we have no targeted approach for educating children (or adults) about these issues. (Our Fair State only recently OK'd teaching birth control in sex education classes. I have never understood how perpetuating ignorance solves a problem, but that's a topic for another post...) It's easy to say that education is the answer, but I believe that the answer is going to be whatever facilitates an appreciation for the fragility and malleability of consciousness and identity. We will need to socially reinforce the idea that integrity of mind is sacrosanct. How exactly this should be accomplished, I do not know (though I have some ideas), but I do see it as the most-probable philosophical and ethical crisis point for which humanists and transhumanists should be preparing.
Monday, October 26, 2009
Free To Be... Neurodiversity vs. Cognitive Liberty
“There are two ways of spreading light: to be the candle or the mirror that reflects it.”
I hereby point you to a recent series of posts on neurodiversity and cognitive liberty, beginning with a post by Casey Rae-Hunter, who identifies himself as an adult with Asperger's, and continuing with his follow-up post, which aims to clarify how neurodiveristy differs from cognitive liberty. The discussion is summarized in a post by George Dvorksy that fed to the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.
Rae-Hunter's Principles of Cognitive Liberty... [My comments are bracketed.]
"1. Cognitive liberty is the basic right of an individual to pursue potentially beneficial psychological/neurological trajectories. If the individual is unable to make these choices themselves, than it is the right of their closest family members to make them, provided they are not coerced by the medical establishment or prevailing social strata. [I don't agree that the last sentence is a forgone conclusion. A non-family advocate, such as a case worker, may do more to actually advocate for the individual in many cases.]
2. Cognitive liberty recognizes that information and education are key to making informed choices. In the absence of such information, cognitive libertarians will advocate for the fullest range of data in when considering treatment options or lifestyle planning.
3. Cognitive liberty recognizes the range of psychological profiles in both the neurotypical world and otherwise. Until and unless an individual's psychology can be determined as infringing on another individual's cognitive liberty, they are free to pursue or not pursue strategies for conventional adaptation, possible enhancement or any other cognitive application — actual or postulatory.
4. Cognitive liberty recognizes the right to pharmacological experimentation, within existing legal structures. Where those structures are not beneficial or unnecessarily inhibit potentially useful individual research, cognitive libertarians reserve the right to challenge legal frameworks (and, where appropriate and with full comprehension of the punitive risks, step beyond them).
5. Cognitive liberty recognizes the essential function of the governmental regulatory apparatus, but places others' cognitive liberty ahead of the societal, legal or bureaucratic status quo. Through education, research and advocacy, cognitive libertarians can and should present information to policymakers that will enhance governmental comprehension of current and emerging issues. Where decisions are made, they must be transparent and open to debate.
6. Cognitive liberty is not an outlier of the neurodiversity movement. It is a separate, but complimentary effort to enhance understanding about the range of possibilities in self-directed cognition."
This is definitely a good start to defining the objectives and guiding principles of cognitive libertarians, but I would like to illuminate one point that may have gotten lost in the initial discussions.
The issues of neurodiversity and cognitive liberty are not restricted to autistics and those in the autism spectrum, though you might be forgiven for thinking that. Dvorsky attempts to extend the discussion a bit by referring to forced modification of sociopathic tendencies, though his support for the idea of cognitive liberty dodges a bit here - "I am admittedly on the fence with this one. My instinct tells me that we should never alter a person’s mind against their will; my common sense tells me that removing sociopathic tendencies is a good thing and ultimately beneficial to that individual. I’m going to have to ruminate over this one a bit further…" (George, dude! I expect a follow-up post from you on this. Give it plenty of thought.)
Potent threats to cognitive liberty can also come from a variety of social pressures faced by 'normal' people, as discussed in a recent posting here, or from the idea that anything that can be classified as a mental pathology should be treated according to current medical guidelines.
We are constantly redefining what it means to be human. Some of these ideas still distress us 150 years after they first appeared. And we now have it within our grasp to artificially change how we express our humanity. It is up to us to make sure that this technology serves our highest ideals about humanity, not our lowest fears.
"One way or another, we all have to find what best fosters the flowering of our humanity in this contemporary life, and dedicate ourselves to that."
I hereby point you to a recent series of posts on neurodiversity and cognitive liberty, beginning with a post by Casey Rae-Hunter, who identifies himself as an adult with Asperger's, and continuing with his follow-up post, which aims to clarify how neurodiveristy differs from cognitive liberty. The discussion is summarized in a post by George Dvorksy that fed to the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.
Rae-Hunter's Principles of Cognitive Liberty... [My comments are bracketed.]
"1. Cognitive liberty is the basic right of an individual to pursue potentially beneficial psychological/neurological trajectories. If the individual is unable to make these choices themselves, than it is the right of their closest family members to make them, provided they are not coerced by the medical establishment or prevailing social strata. [I don't agree that the last sentence is a forgone conclusion. A non-family advocate, such as a case worker, may do more to actually advocate for the individual in many cases.]
2. Cognitive liberty recognizes that information and education are key to making informed choices. In the absence of such information, cognitive libertarians will advocate for the fullest range of data in when considering treatment options or lifestyle planning.
3. Cognitive liberty recognizes the range of psychological profiles in both the neurotypical world and otherwise. Until and unless an individual's psychology can be determined as infringing on another individual's cognitive liberty, they are free to pursue or not pursue strategies for conventional adaptation, possible enhancement or any other cognitive application — actual or postulatory.
4. Cognitive liberty recognizes the right to pharmacological experimentation, within existing legal structures. Where those structures are not beneficial or unnecessarily inhibit potentially useful individual research, cognitive libertarians reserve the right to challenge legal frameworks (and, where appropriate and with full comprehension of the punitive risks, step beyond them).
5. Cognitive liberty recognizes the essential function of the governmental regulatory apparatus, but places others' cognitive liberty ahead of the societal, legal or bureaucratic status quo. Through education, research and advocacy, cognitive libertarians can and should present information to policymakers that will enhance governmental comprehension of current and emerging issues. Where decisions are made, they must be transparent and open to debate.
6. Cognitive liberty is not an outlier of the neurodiversity movement. It is a separate, but complimentary effort to enhance understanding about the range of possibilities in self-directed cognition."
This is definitely a good start to defining the objectives and guiding principles of cognitive libertarians, but I would like to illuminate one point that may have gotten lost in the initial discussions.
The issues of neurodiversity and cognitive liberty are not restricted to autistics and those in the autism spectrum, though you might be forgiven for thinking that. Dvorsky attempts to extend the discussion a bit by referring to forced modification of sociopathic tendencies, though his support for the idea of cognitive liberty dodges a bit here - "I am admittedly on the fence with this one. My instinct tells me that we should never alter a person’s mind against their will; my common sense tells me that removing sociopathic tendencies is a good thing and ultimately beneficial to that individual. I’m going to have to ruminate over this one a bit further…" (George, dude! I expect a follow-up post from you on this. Give it plenty of thought.)
Potent threats to cognitive liberty can also come from a variety of social pressures faced by 'normal' people, as discussed in a recent posting here, or from the idea that anything that can be classified as a mental pathology should be treated according to current medical guidelines.
We are constantly redefining what it means to be human. Some of these ideas still distress us 150 years after they first appeared. And we now have it within our grasp to artificially change how we express our humanity. It is up to us to make sure that this technology serves our highest ideals about humanity, not our lowest fears.
"One way or another, we all have to find what best fosters the flowering of our humanity in this contemporary life, and dedicate ourselves to that."
Friday, October 9, 2009
Free To Be... Cosmetic Neurology
(This one's for the 'friend' who recently offered me some of her prescription drugs.)
"We live in a culture that believes medication can solve almost any problem."
"The last thing a person concerned with brain power should do is gamble with using chemicals that influence her brain in ways that we do not understand."
- From a November 2009 Glamour article on 'sharing' prescription drugs.
Ignore the really large cup of coffee on my desk. I don't need it to write well, but it helps. This is the extent of my sympathy with chemically-tailored cognition.
The irony is that I will argue long and hard for cognitive liberty - your right to "the absolute sovereignty of [your] own consciousness." But the current trends towards accepting the expanded use of 'smart drugs' make me nervous.
Maybe it's because I was inundated with anti-drug messages during my formative years. There was a war on drugs that included some fairly-effective propaganda aimed at teenagers and young people. Apparently that message doesn't apply to these drugs.
In her Glamour article on the (apparently) common practice of sharing prescription drugs, the author includes statements like this - "While most experts agree that unsupervised pill popping is always risky, some have actually suggested that stimulants such as Adderall, Ritalin and Provigil should eventually become more available to people as study and work aids. In an editorial published last year in the scientific journal Nature, seven leading experts in medicine, science and law argued that using these drugs to boost mental performance was the way of the future. 'Cognitive enhancement has much to offer individuals and society,' they said." While the article continues on to describe the potential downfall of this type of drug use, we are left with the feeling that the scientific 'stamp of approval' has already been given via the quote from Nature. (That Nature article gets around.)
And the cover story of the current issue of Scientific American tackles the same issue. (Boo! for not making the whole article available online.)
On principle, I object to the fact that the average reader has no access to the actual science that is being used to support various arguments for or against cosmetic neurology, and must rely on secondhand reports and media coverage for information.
But my stronger objection is this... The current practices of cosmetic neurology and cognitive enhancement include plenty of unregulated activity, as illustrated by the Glamour article. The danger is that this activity will/has become so prevalent that it establishes new norms to which others are then obliged and/or pressured to conform.
And therein lies a paradox - How do you argue for the cognitive liberty of the individual when the exercise of that liberty may result in a decrease in liberty for those who follow? Should my children by obligated to take 'smart drugs' to stay competitive in school? Should I be obligated to take antidepressants to maintain a new standard of 'normal' behavior in my workplace?
And while there may currently be no explicit policies in place to mandate this type of drug use, our ideas about what is 'normal' are slowly and surely being altered to conform to new ideas about what is possible. "Our boss has started getting on my case for not being as productive... [as the guy] using unprescribed modafinil to work crazy hours..." (q) Hidden in every article referenced in this post are warnings about the unknown consequences of long-term, unprescribed, or unapproved use of prescription drugs for cosmetic (non-disease treating) purposes. Yet who will have the patience to wait for definitive scientific findings? And who will want to accept that s/he does not have the right to 'dope' his/her brain, especially if the practice is prevalent among peers?
"If we can improve cognitive systems in disease, can we also do so in health? Should we?" - Cosmetic neurology: The controversy over enhancing movement, mentation, and mood. Anjan Chatterjee, MD (2004).
I like my current state of cognition. I'd like the freedom to keep it as it is. If your freedom to change your state of mind interferes with my freedom to not change my state of mind, then we'll have to throw down. In the meantime, let's all make informed choices.
"We live in a culture that believes medication can solve almost any problem."
"The last thing a person concerned with brain power should do is gamble with using chemicals that influence her brain in ways that we do not understand."
- From a November 2009 Glamour article on 'sharing' prescription drugs.
Ignore the really large cup of coffee on my desk. I don't need it to write well, but it helps. This is the extent of my sympathy with chemically-tailored cognition.
The irony is that I will argue long and hard for cognitive liberty - your right to "the absolute sovereignty of [your] own consciousness." But the current trends towards accepting the expanded use of 'smart drugs' make me nervous.
Maybe it's because I was inundated with anti-drug messages during my formative years. There was a war on drugs that included some fairly-effective propaganda aimed at teenagers and young people. Apparently that message doesn't apply to these drugs.
In her Glamour article on the (apparently) common practice of sharing prescription drugs, the author includes statements like this - "While most experts agree that unsupervised pill popping is always risky, some have actually suggested that stimulants such as Adderall, Ritalin and Provigil should eventually become more available to people as study and work aids. In an editorial published last year in the scientific journal Nature, seven leading experts in medicine, science and law argued that using these drugs to boost mental performance was the way of the future. 'Cognitive enhancement has much to offer individuals and society,' they said." While the article continues on to describe the potential downfall of this type of drug use, we are left with the feeling that the scientific 'stamp of approval' has already been given via the quote from Nature. (That Nature article gets around.)
And the cover story of the current issue of Scientific American tackles the same issue. (Boo! for not making the whole article available online.)
On principle, I object to the fact that the average reader has no access to the actual science that is being used to support various arguments for or against cosmetic neurology, and must rely on secondhand reports and media coverage for information.
But my stronger objection is this... The current practices of cosmetic neurology and cognitive enhancement include plenty of unregulated activity, as illustrated by the Glamour article. The danger is that this activity will/has become so prevalent that it establishes new norms to which others are then obliged and/or pressured to conform.
And therein lies a paradox - How do you argue for the cognitive liberty of the individual when the exercise of that liberty may result in a decrease in liberty for those who follow? Should my children by obligated to take 'smart drugs' to stay competitive in school? Should I be obligated to take antidepressants to maintain a new standard of 'normal' behavior in my workplace?
And while there may currently be no explicit policies in place to mandate this type of drug use, our ideas about what is 'normal' are slowly and surely being altered to conform to new ideas about what is possible. "Our boss has started getting on my case for not being as productive... [as the guy] using unprescribed modafinil to work crazy hours..." (q) Hidden in every article referenced in this post are warnings about the unknown consequences of long-term, unprescribed, or unapproved use of prescription drugs for cosmetic (non-disease treating) purposes. Yet who will have the patience to wait for definitive scientific findings? And who will want to accept that s/he does not have the right to 'dope' his/her brain, especially if the practice is prevalent among peers?
"If we can improve cognitive systems in disease, can we also do so in health? Should we?" - Cosmetic neurology: The controversy over enhancing movement, mentation, and mood. Anjan Chatterjee, MD (2004).
I like my current state of cognition. I'd like the freedom to keep it as it is. If your freedom to change your state of mind interferes with my freedom to not change my state of mind, then we'll have to throw down. In the meantime, let's all make informed choices.
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