"The stupidest norm was happier; he could feel that he belonged. We did not, and because we did not, we had no positive - we were condemned to negatives, to not revealing ourselves, to not speaking when we would, to not using what we knew, to not being found out - to a life of perpetual deception, concealment, and lying."
Yesterday I participated in a mock interview exercise. (I don't really know why I did it; interviews don't scare me. Having to be inappropriately employed scares me...) We got to the end of the mock interview, and the gentleman, in reviewing it with me, says, with all apparent sincerity, "I can tell you're a really genuine person." At which point I almost said "You bought that load of bullshit?!?"
Admittedly it wasn't complete bullshit. But let's just say that the past and I have choreographed a set of moves that hides our respective flaws and that can appear quite... genuine when necessary. Upon reflection, I suspect the gentleman (whom I've known to be quite insightful) might have intentionally planted that statement to cause me to reflect on what I was really doing in playing this game. Why was I so good at projecting a genuineness that wasn't entirely genuine? And why was I willing to do it at all?
If there has been an underlying theme of reflection in my summer thus far, it has been Authenticity. Several autobiographies that chronicle women's struggles to find and be their authentic selves have presented themselves at (one might say) oddly synchronous times. I've lately come to terms with the fact that my weight fluctuates in direct proportion with how (pardon the phrase) inauthentically I'm living at the time. And in a rather uncharacteristic display of temper, I recently lost it at the person who suggested that I "probably shouldn't tell people that you have a Ph.D." (For the record, telling people that I have a Ph.D. is not something I do, but in context, the suggestion was that I should 'dumb down' my level of discourse, especially if I "wanted to attract a husband.") Perhaps my reflecting on authenticity is also what caused me to give the gentleman more credit than he may deserve in making his statement about my genuineness.
Living an 'authentic life' is a hot topic right now in quasi-spiritual literature. "The idea of being authentic has caught our attention much like the word empowered did a few years ago." (q) Despite the prevalence of advice on authentic living, I have not dwelt much on other people's thoughts on the subject. (What can I say? I have a general aversion to received wisdom. People's brutally honest autobiographies, however, are another story.) One meta-reflection has stood out to me though. According to Maslow, "the most basic level of needs must be met before the individual will strongly desire (or focus motivation upon) the secondary or higher level needs." Rough translation - you won't be worrying about "becom[ing] everything that one is capable of becoming" if you are worried about being homeless. That so many people (including my unemployed self) can be concerned at all with living an authentic life says something...
Perhaps the struggle for authenticity isn't what Maslow was referring to in his description of struggling for/towards self-actualization. Maslow did describe self-actualized people as possessing "an unusual ability to detect the spurious, the fake, and the dishonest in personality," as well as "embrac[ing] reality and facts rather than denying truth." Yet you could argue that authenticity is merely one of the characteristics of self-actualization. But if the need for authenticity does not emerge as a part of the need for self-actualization, then where does it come from? What gives rise to the feeling of misery when one compromises authenticity to fulfill the more basic need for (economic) safety?
"Being authentic is being able to say yes when you mean it and no when you need to." (q) And in a world where doing so would not negatively affect your ability to meet any of your lower level needs, you could probably do that. Most of us are stopped from being authentic in that way because we have learned that compromise is necessary in order to meet the needs for safety and love. To suggest otherwise is to suggest a radically different view of what reality is, and leaves us with visions of a universe that rewards desire, want, and selfishness. Dissident thoughts indeed.
One of the few things I remember from Sunday School is that JOY was presented to us as an acronym. In order to have joy in your life, you needed to put Jesus first, Others second, and Yourself last. And indeed, to make misery bearable, we often tell ourselves that love is putting yourself last. So which is it? Putting yourself first and living 'authentically', or putting yourself last in the spirit of service to others/a higher purpose? Ironically, both perspectives are attached to 'spiritual' ideas about what reality is - ideas that provide justification and reward for those who follow their tenets, though the rewards take radically different forms.
Perhaps the truth is simply that people will be as selfish as they can comfortably be in any given situation, and will adopt whatever philosophy (or combination of philosophies) is necessary in order to feel better about their choices...
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Avoiding Stultifying Affairs
"One must avoid stultifying affairs."
During this heat wave I'm enticing myself to get up and walk very early in the morning by listening to Walter Isaacson's biography of Einstein on the ipod while I walk. This morning I got to the portion of Einstein's life where he is unemployed after graduation. A friend offers to help Einstein obtain a job at his company: an offer that Einstein refuses with the proclamation that "one must avoid stultifying affairs." I laughed when I heard that.
Currently unemployed myself, I have recently submitted a number of applications for positions that I find to be... less than optimum. I feel decidely unhappy when I do this, in marked contrast to the surprising feeling of general well-being that has pervaded my days since becoming unemployed. Past experience indicates that I should be feeling quite anxious given my situation. And we constantly hear about how difficult it is to find a good job these days, which should only add to my anxiety. Intellectually, I know that this means I should leave no stone unturned in my job search, including those stones that aren't so shiny, but emotionally... Emotionally, I seem to disagree, feeling anxious only when I apply for a position that I don't particularly want.
For awhile now I've been wondering about my general lack of anxiety. My past experience with unemployment says that I should be feeling highly anxious. The idea that I should be feeling anxious is supported by Maslow's hierarchy of needs: the second need in the pyramid being the need for safety, including economic safety. And I'm certainly not sitting on a pile of money. However, instead of feeling anxious, I feel relatively calm. The disparity has been great enough to prompt some introspective spelunking in an attempt to answer the question: From what wellspring issues forth this fountain of tranquility?
Have I reached a threshhold of sustaining metaphysical belief? Is this feeling of well-being externally imposed? Have I been doing something that has managed to supplant my feelings of anxiety? Or is it simply that I currently have a day-to-day existence that is almost completely free of "stultifying affairs"?
Einstein's phrase has been stuck in my head all day. It occurred to me that there are actually two possible ways to interpret it. 1) One must avoid those situations (affairs) which, by their nature, render one incapable of enthusiasm. 2) One must avoid bringing about a state of affairs that thwarts one's own interests, such as taking a job that does not represent a change for the better in one's life. Either interpretation represents wisdom, IMHO.
Today I decided to avoid stultifying affairs by spending a few hours blogging.
During this heat wave I'm enticing myself to get up and walk very early in the morning by listening to Walter Isaacson's biography of Einstein on the ipod while I walk. This morning I got to the portion of Einstein's life where he is unemployed after graduation. A friend offers to help Einstein obtain a job at his company: an offer that Einstein refuses with the proclamation that "one must avoid stultifying affairs." I laughed when I heard that.
Currently unemployed myself, I have recently submitted a number of applications for positions that I find to be... less than optimum. I feel decidely unhappy when I do this, in marked contrast to the surprising feeling of general well-being that has pervaded my days since becoming unemployed. Past experience indicates that I should be feeling quite anxious given my situation. And we constantly hear about how difficult it is to find a good job these days, which should only add to my anxiety. Intellectually, I know that this means I should leave no stone unturned in my job search, including those stones that aren't so shiny, but emotionally... Emotionally, I seem to disagree, feeling anxious only when I apply for a position that I don't particularly want.
For awhile now I've been wondering about my general lack of anxiety. My past experience with unemployment says that I should be feeling highly anxious. The idea that I should be feeling anxious is supported by Maslow's hierarchy of needs: the second need in the pyramid being the need for safety, including economic safety. And I'm certainly not sitting on a pile of money. However, instead of feeling anxious, I feel relatively calm. The disparity has been great enough to prompt some introspective spelunking in an attempt to answer the question: From what wellspring issues forth this fountain of tranquility?
Have I reached a threshhold of sustaining metaphysical belief? Is this feeling of well-being externally imposed? Have I been doing something that has managed to supplant my feelings of anxiety? Or is it simply that I currently have a day-to-day existence that is almost completely free of "stultifying affairs"?
Einstein's phrase has been stuck in my head all day. It occurred to me that there are actually two possible ways to interpret it. 1) One must avoid those situations (affairs) which, by their nature, render one incapable of enthusiasm. 2) One must avoid bringing about a state of affairs that thwarts one's own interests, such as taking a job that does not represent a change for the better in one's life. Either interpretation represents wisdom, IMHO.
Today I decided to avoid stultifying affairs by spending a few hours blogging.
Sunday, June 5, 2011
Born This Way
"Yes, you're struggling and you're suffering and it's hard to be you. But the flip side of that that's really exciting is... [p]eople like you have invented great things."
"You can tell your child that he has been given the label 'gifted' as long as he also knows that it doesn't mean he is smarter or better than anyone, just that he performs well on a certain kind of test."
Ah, the irony of seeing (in this morning's paper) a family movie review for X-Men: First Class right next to a parenthood advice column containing the two approaches to take with a 'gifted' child noted above. Can you tell which one came from an 'expert' and which one came from another parent? I bet you can't.
The entire plot of X-Men: First Class revolves around how two groups of equally 'gifted' young adults end up on diverging paths with respect to how they perceive their relationship with those who are not similarly 'gifted'. A recurring desire expressed by mutants on both sides in the movie is the desire to feel normal, or to feel accepted for one's true self. To not have to hide. To not feel like a 'freak'. "They tend to feel different from their peers." (q) This sentiment is eloquently highlighted in the following trailer...
There's an obvious, though not overtly compared, difference between Charles and Erik with respect to their upbringings. Charles grew up with security and privilege, while Erik grew up in the shadow of someone who used torture to motivate. Erik could not escape being a target as a result of his 'gift', and consequently believed that the only safety was in being more powerful than those who would target or oppress you. Charles, perhaps because of his wealth/security, did not acquire the same set of learned perceptions of and responses to that which Erik perceived as a threat. X-Men: First Class has a lot to say about the contribution of nurture to the makings of a hero or a monster.
The only characters we are supposed to sympathize with in X-Men: First Class are mutants. There are simply no non-mutant characters of note. This works because there is some part in all of us that can identify with feeling like an outcast. Yet who but those who have felt truly isolated by an apparently unbridgeable gap between themselves and others can understand what it means to be with others who were like them? For the exceptionally smart - the ones who are typically labeled 'gifted' by schools - being with others like them may mean not having to deliberately downplay one's intellect. It may mean being able to exercise the full range of one's abilities without having to worry about the social consequences.
There is inherent suffering in having to hide any portion of one's true self. Yet we all make concessions of one sort or another to the social environments in which we live. The more extreme the concessions, the more extreme the suffering. Perhaps the most painful concessions are those which are predicated on the belief that something about our genetic makeup is unacceptable. The fact that you were born this way, and know no other way to be with respect to these traits, makes denying them especially painful.
If there is something to be learned from X-Men: First Class, perhaps it is that the message to parents of a gifted child (or of any child who struggles with being different in a significant way) should be: Find your child a social environment where s/he feels accepted and safe, and where s/he is encouraged to express his/her full range of abilities and true nature.
"You can tell your child that he has been given the label 'gifted' as long as he also knows that it doesn't mean he is smarter or better than anyone, just that he performs well on a certain kind of test."
Ah, the irony of seeing (in this morning's paper) a family movie review for X-Men: First Class right next to a parenthood advice column containing the two approaches to take with a 'gifted' child noted above. Can you tell which one came from an 'expert' and which one came from another parent? I bet you can't.
The entire plot of X-Men: First Class revolves around how two groups of equally 'gifted' young adults end up on diverging paths with respect to how they perceive their relationship with those who are not similarly 'gifted'. A recurring desire expressed by mutants on both sides in the movie is the desire to feel normal, or to feel accepted for one's true self. To not have to hide. To not feel like a 'freak'. "They tend to feel different from their peers." (q) This sentiment is eloquently highlighted in the following trailer...
There's an obvious, though not overtly compared, difference between Charles and Erik with respect to their upbringings. Charles grew up with security and privilege, while Erik grew up in the shadow of someone who used torture to motivate. Erik could not escape being a target as a result of his 'gift', and consequently believed that the only safety was in being more powerful than those who would target or oppress you. Charles, perhaps because of his wealth/security, did not acquire the same set of learned perceptions of and responses to that which Erik perceived as a threat. X-Men: First Class has a lot to say about the contribution of nurture to the makings of a hero or a monster.
The only characters we are supposed to sympathize with in X-Men: First Class are mutants. There are simply no non-mutant characters of note. This works because there is some part in all of us that can identify with feeling like an outcast. Yet who but those who have felt truly isolated by an apparently unbridgeable gap between themselves and others can understand what it means to be with others who were like them? For the exceptionally smart - the ones who are typically labeled 'gifted' by schools - being with others like them may mean not having to deliberately downplay one's intellect. It may mean being able to exercise the full range of one's abilities without having to worry about the social consequences.
There is inherent suffering in having to hide any portion of one's true self. Yet we all make concessions of one sort or another to the social environments in which we live. The more extreme the concessions, the more extreme the suffering. Perhaps the most painful concessions are those which are predicated on the belief that something about our genetic makeup is unacceptable. The fact that you were born this way, and know no other way to be with respect to these traits, makes denying them especially painful.
If there is something to be learned from X-Men: First Class, perhaps it is that the message to parents of a gifted child (or of any child who struggles with being different in a significant way) should be: Find your child a social environment where s/he feels accepted and safe, and where s/he is encouraged to express his/her full range of abilities and true nature.
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Let Me Be Myself
"Tell me please would you one time
Let me be myself
So I can shine with my own light"
I've been thinking a lot about our sense of self lately. Perhaps because mine feels so... different right now. No, I'm not on any medications that would account for this change, but that didn't stop me from being intrigued by a recent paper in the journal Neuroethics called Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology, by Felicitas Kraemer.
Kraemer begins by extensively discussing Peter Kramer's 1993 book Listening to Prozac (which I own, but have not yet read). Kramer describes a woman who, by all accounts, was never particularly happy and outgoing, as experiencing such a positive change in personality on Prozac that she didn't want to stop taking it because "she is not herself anymore without it." She now identified with a 'true self' that hadn't emerged until she'd been medicated. "...Kramer described the process as one of a redefinition of the self" where "the socially competent and cheerful self that is prevalent under Prozac is declared as the 'real self,' whereas the less welcome, shy and depressed one, is not experienced as real anymore." The implication, of course, is that since the 'new' self conforms to a (socially-approved of) "better or even 'ideal' self", then that self must be a more authentic representation of the real person. The paradox, of course, is that since we typically define authenticity as a combination of naturalness of origin and consistency with the past, how can a sense of self arising from an "artificial enhancement device" like Prozac lead to a more authentic self?
Or, to reframe Kraemer's reframing of the question, is Prozac creating something that was never there and is thereby inauthentic, or is Prozac enabling us to access something that was always there, always possible, and which can thereby be deemed to be authentic? Is Prozac simply peeling back a slightly rotten top layer of the emotional onion, revealing something 'better' that has been there all along? What is the genuine article with respect to our emotions and the behaviors arising from them?
Is an emotion genuine because I feel it, or is it genuine because it is consistent with how I have previously felt and how I think that I should feel? Or is the difference between the two only worth debating if I'm unwilling to accept and integrate the new emotions into my sense of self? With respect to consenting adults who have unrestricted access to these technologies, you might leave it strictly up to the individual to decide what is or is not 'authentic'. But because many self-altering medications are prescribed to minors who may have barely had a chance to develop a sense of self on par with that of consenting adults, and because social pressure is the source of most of our ideas about what an acceptable sense of self is, the issue of authenticity is of broader concern.
To what degree do we owe it to a person to allow them to develop as naturally as possible? I have a friend whose child has been diagnosed with ADHD. The child's 'wild' behavior creates difficulties for the parents and teachers, but the child is boisterous, gregarious, and happy, and does not appear to be suffering. So far the parents have not medicated this child, but their doctor has put it out there as an option for the future. I wonder about whose needs/desires will ultimately take precedence in this situation. Will 'the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the one', or will the child be allowed to continue as his 'wild' happy self because that is who he is?
And when will the child be self-aware enough to realize that something may have been taken away from him if he were medicated? Kraemer claims to "support the more general, conceptual thesis that people do not experience artificial emotions when taking drugs of whatever kind," a thesis that I reject. I believe that it is possible to be self-aware enough to realize (simultaneously with the occurring emotion) when an emotional response is inconsistent with one's previous history of responses to similar circumstances, and that that inconsistency is enough to cause one to deem the emotion 'artificial' or 'inauthentic'. And forcing an inconsistent emotional response upon a person is a deep violation of the very essence of our experiencing, sentient selves.
Kraemer concludes (wrongly, IMHO) that the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' is only relevant with respect to the source or means by which the emotion is produced, and not with respect to how the emotion is experienced. (p. 55) Yet, ironically, Kraemer goes on to argue that an emotion can be claimed to be authentic "if the individuals experiencing it recognize their own feelings really as their own and identify with them." (p. 58) We seem to be disagreeing about the degree of equivalency between 'natural' and 'authentic', and between 'inauthentic' and 'artificial'...
It may very well be possible that a person can be unaware enough of the differences in felt emotions to appreciate which ones arise from the use of an artificial technology. Further, it's entirely possible that they just don't care about the inconsistency between the way they responded emotionally in the past and the way they are currently responding. But this should not be considered to be a reasonable assumption with respect to all people, and the law should be designed to protect those who notice a difference and are bothered by it.
It's entirely possible that one's sense of self will 'evolve' over time to accommodate the new set of emotional responses. It's even possible that this new sense of self will be appreciated and deemed qualitatively better than the flawed, old self that experienced emotions or had responses that were 'not desirable'. But it's my belief that such changes should never be forced upon anyone, either by the law or by social pressure. (Kraemer's article includes illustrations from Kramer's book of people who were very bothered by discrepancy between how they felt and how they knew they should feel.)
Our social norms do include a historical appreciation and respect for authenticity, but how will this respect sustain itself (or not) in the face of increasingly easier (and more radical) ways to modify oneself? Kraemer critically cites transhumanist Nick Bostrom's work as an overly simplistic view of how easy making 'emotional improvements' would be. She points out that "[c]hanging our emotional life means changing our cultural and epistemic norms." Perhaps more importantly though, judgments about the authenticity of emotions reside first and foremost with the subjective experiencer, determined by the degree to which they are or are not able to integrate the emotional changes into their existing sense of self. And it is inconsistency that erodes our sense of self. As Kraemer puts it, "[o]ur emotions depend on each other in a fragile nexus that can easily be destroyed by uncontrolled manipulation." And without a strong, consistent sense of self, who are we?
Let me be myself
So I can shine with my own light"
I've been thinking a lot about our sense of self lately. Perhaps because mine feels so... different right now. No, I'm not on any medications that would account for this change, but that didn't stop me from being intrigued by a recent paper in the journal Neuroethics called Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology, by Felicitas Kraemer.
Kraemer begins by extensively discussing Peter Kramer's 1993 book Listening to Prozac (which I own, but have not yet read). Kramer describes a woman who, by all accounts, was never particularly happy and outgoing, as experiencing such a positive change in personality on Prozac that she didn't want to stop taking it because "she is not herself anymore without it." She now identified with a 'true self' that hadn't emerged until she'd been medicated. "...Kramer described the process as one of a redefinition of the self" where "the socially competent and cheerful self that is prevalent under Prozac is declared as the 'real self,' whereas the less welcome, shy and depressed one, is not experienced as real anymore." The implication, of course, is that since the 'new' self conforms to a (socially-approved of) "better or even 'ideal' self", then that self must be a more authentic representation of the real person. The paradox, of course, is that since we typically define authenticity as a combination of naturalness of origin and consistency with the past, how can a sense of self arising from an "artificial enhancement device" like Prozac lead to a more authentic self?
Or, to reframe Kraemer's reframing of the question, is Prozac creating something that was never there and is thereby inauthentic, or is Prozac enabling us to access something that was always there, always possible, and which can thereby be deemed to be authentic? Is Prozac simply peeling back a slightly rotten top layer of the emotional onion, revealing something 'better' that has been there all along? What is the genuine article with respect to our emotions and the behaviors arising from them?
Is an emotion genuine because I feel it, or is it genuine because it is consistent with how I have previously felt and how I think that I should feel? Or is the difference between the two only worth debating if I'm unwilling to accept and integrate the new emotions into my sense of self? With respect to consenting adults who have unrestricted access to these technologies, you might leave it strictly up to the individual to decide what is or is not 'authentic'. But because many self-altering medications are prescribed to minors who may have barely had a chance to develop a sense of self on par with that of consenting adults, and because social pressure is the source of most of our ideas about what an acceptable sense of self is, the issue of authenticity is of broader concern.
To what degree do we owe it to a person to allow them to develop as naturally as possible? I have a friend whose child has been diagnosed with ADHD. The child's 'wild' behavior creates difficulties for the parents and teachers, but the child is boisterous, gregarious, and happy, and does not appear to be suffering. So far the parents have not medicated this child, but their doctor has put it out there as an option for the future. I wonder about whose needs/desires will ultimately take precedence in this situation. Will 'the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the one', or will the child be allowed to continue as his 'wild' happy self because that is who he is?
And when will the child be self-aware enough to realize that something may have been taken away from him if he were medicated? Kraemer claims to "support the more general, conceptual thesis that people do not experience artificial emotions when taking drugs of whatever kind," a thesis that I reject. I believe that it is possible to be self-aware enough to realize (simultaneously with the occurring emotion) when an emotional response is inconsistent with one's previous history of responses to similar circumstances, and that that inconsistency is enough to cause one to deem the emotion 'artificial' or 'inauthentic'. And forcing an inconsistent emotional response upon a person is a deep violation of the very essence of our experiencing, sentient selves.
Kraemer concludes (wrongly, IMHO) that the distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' is only relevant with respect to the source or means by which the emotion is produced, and not with respect to how the emotion is experienced. (p. 55) Yet, ironically, Kraemer goes on to argue that an emotion can be claimed to be authentic "if the individuals experiencing it recognize their own feelings really as their own and identify with them." (p. 58) We seem to be disagreeing about the degree of equivalency between 'natural' and 'authentic', and between 'inauthentic' and 'artificial'...
It may very well be possible that a person can be unaware enough of the differences in felt emotions to appreciate which ones arise from the use of an artificial technology. Further, it's entirely possible that they just don't care about the inconsistency between the way they responded emotionally in the past and the way they are currently responding. But this should not be considered to be a reasonable assumption with respect to all people, and the law should be designed to protect those who notice a difference and are bothered by it.
It's entirely possible that one's sense of self will 'evolve' over time to accommodate the new set of emotional responses. It's even possible that this new sense of self will be appreciated and deemed qualitatively better than the flawed, old self that experienced emotions or had responses that were 'not desirable'. But it's my belief that such changes should never be forced upon anyone, either by the law or by social pressure. (Kraemer's article includes illustrations from Kramer's book of people who were very bothered by discrepancy between how they felt and how they knew they should feel.)
Our social norms do include a historical appreciation and respect for authenticity, but how will this respect sustain itself (or not) in the face of increasingly easier (and more radical) ways to modify oneself? Kraemer critically cites transhumanist Nick Bostrom's work as an overly simplistic view of how easy making 'emotional improvements' would be. She points out that "[c]hanging our emotional life means changing our cultural and epistemic norms." Perhaps more importantly though, judgments about the authenticity of emotions reside first and foremost with the subjective experiencer, determined by the degree to which they are or are not able to integrate the emotional changes into their existing sense of self. And it is inconsistency that erodes our sense of self. As Kraemer puts it, "[o]ur emotions depend on each other in a fragile nexus that can easily be destroyed by uncontrolled manipulation." And without a strong, consistent sense of self, who are we?
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Hero/Monster
"Who's gonna fight for the weak?
Who's gonna make 'em believe?
I've got a hero, I've got a hero Living in me"
- Hero, Awake by Skillet (track 1)
"The secret side of me, I never let you see
I keep it caged but I can't control it
So stay away from me, the beast is ugly
I feel the rage and I just can't hold it"
- Monster, Awake by Skillet (track 2)
I've got a lawyer living in me. And a lawyer that has been cross-pollinated by a psychologist is a dangerous thing indeed: a dangerous thing with an interest in neuroethics...
It amazes me what people will attempt to use as a defense for committing a crime (or for just behaving badly). It amazes me, perhaps, because every attempted defense is a statement of sorts about what we believe it is that makes us who we are. At a very basic level, it's a statement about what it means to be human. Are we our nature, or are we our nurture? From whence cometh the hero, or the monster?
[ASIDE: As a huge fan of multi-dimensional modeling (huge!), I once commented that, as we all agree that the truth is some combination of nature and nurture, the prudent course would be for science present the nature/nurture debate from an 'overlapping windows' perspective. Not all aspects of the phenotypical expression of our genetic nature are equally susceptible to the nurturing (or lack thereof) of environmental influence. Furthermore, a single aspect of our genetic nature may not be equally susceptible to environmental influence at different points within our lifespan. There are critical windows in development where the influence of nurture can have a much more dramatic impact on the way our nature develops. This really isn't news to anybody, when you stop to think about it, yet the idea that a single gene is somehow 'responsible' for our behavior persists, and convinces juries.]
The dangerous idea in both cases is that we are somehow not responsible for who we are, and by extension, for what we do. As the social and biological sciences advance, we believe that we are acquiring increasing power to explain why we do what we do. But having a partial understanding of why we might behave in a particular way is itself not enough to absolve any individual of responsibility for a particular action.
There is now a pathological characterization for people who are obsessed with brain pathologies as acceptable legal excuses - Brain Overclaim Syndrome, "the essential feature of which is to make claims about the implications of neuroscience for criminal responsibility that cannot be conceptually or empirically sustained." Morse's allegation that "[b]rains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes" brings up (yet does not answer) an interesting question: what is a person, if not his/her brain?
"For a materialist, the brain always plays a causal role in behavior. Despite all the astonishing recent advances in neuroscience, however, we still know woefully little about how the brain enables the mind, and especially about how consciousness and intentionality can arise from the complicated hunk of matter that is the brain." (Quoting a slightly different version of this paper which appeared in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings (2010).) But the legal arguments need only demonstrate that "an agent’s capacity for rationality might be diminished by faulty neurotransmitters, psychological stress, trauma, or a host of other causes" (q, my emphasis) in order to argue that criminal responsibility for a particular action (which is based on certain presumptions of rationality) need not apply.
Morse's argument hinges around the idea of responsibility: an idea that was developed from and predicated on what we subjectively understand about our mental experiences. He argues that the correct perspective (and therefore also the correct use of neuroscience) is one which accepts the idea of responsibility (the internalist perspective). In contrast, an externalist perspective is based on the idea "determinism... is true or that our mental states play no role in explaining our behavior", and is therefore outside the current framework of our understanding of responsibility. In other words, the externalist perspective states that everything that we experience as human beings is essentially irrelevant in explaining our behavior. Morse argues (correctly, IMHO) that this perspective is inconsistent with the entire notion of responsibility.
Morse has written a fascinating and beautifully-nuanced argument in either source, and the real world-oriented humanist would do well to give some consideration to the question raised above: What is a person, if not simply his/her brain? I suspect that Morse never intended to answer that question, but rather only to illustrate that since our understanding of the brain is partial (one might even say minimal), a person should be judged by behavioral criteria of responsibility, rather than by what we think we may know about their brain. The use of neuroscientific 'evidence' should be used to support, rather than override, behavioral observations.
In the larger picture, the same can be said for other attempts to 'blame' behavior on various (usually oversimplified) aspects of genetics or environment. "Partial knowledge about causation does not mean that there is partial causation." Likewise, "[c]ausation cannot be an excuse per se for an internalist, who accepts responsibility, because all behavior is caused and thus all behavior would have to be excused." Morse, a determinist himself, believes that responsibility is compatible with determinism, however he defers the explanation of such compatibility to a realm other than science. "Science cannot resolve the dispute because the issue is metaphysical and normative and it is unlikely ever to be resolved by logic."
"As the biological and behavioral sciences offer ever more sophisticated understandings of normal and abnormal behavior alike, there will be constant pressure to use their findings to affect assessment of criminal responsibility and other legal doctrines. A lot will be at stake morally, politically and legally, and much will be debatable." I concur.
Who's gonna make 'em believe?
I've got a hero, I've got a hero Living in me"
- Hero, Awake by Skillet (track 1)
"The secret side of me, I never let you see
I keep it caged but I can't control it
So stay away from me, the beast is ugly
I feel the rage and I just can't hold it"
- Monster, Awake by Skillet (track 2)
I've got a lawyer living in me. And a lawyer that has been cross-pollinated by a psychologist is a dangerous thing indeed: a dangerous thing with an interest in neuroethics...
It amazes me what people will attempt to use as a defense for committing a crime (or for just behaving badly). It amazes me, perhaps, because every attempted defense is a statement of sorts about what we believe it is that makes us who we are. At a very basic level, it's a statement about what it means to be human. Are we our nature, or are we our nurture? From whence cometh the hero, or the monster?
[ASIDE: As a huge fan of multi-dimensional modeling (huge!), I once commented that, as we all agree that the truth is some combination of nature and nurture, the prudent course would be for science present the nature/nurture debate from an 'overlapping windows' perspective. Not all aspects of the phenotypical expression of our genetic nature are equally susceptible to the nurturing (or lack thereof) of environmental influence. Furthermore, a single aspect of our genetic nature may not be equally susceptible to environmental influence at different points within our lifespan. There are critical windows in development where the influence of nurture can have a much more dramatic impact on the way our nature develops. This really isn't news to anybody, when you stop to think about it, yet the idea that a single gene is somehow 'responsible' for our behavior persists, and convinces juries.]
The dangerous idea in both cases is that we are somehow not responsible for who we are, and by extension, for what we do. As the social and biological sciences advance, we believe that we are acquiring increasing power to explain why we do what we do. But having a partial understanding of why we might behave in a particular way is itself not enough to absolve any individual of responsibility for a particular action.
There is now a pathological characterization for people who are obsessed with brain pathologies as acceptable legal excuses - Brain Overclaim Syndrome, "the essential feature of which is to make claims about the implications of neuroscience for criminal responsibility that cannot be conceptually or empirically sustained." Morse's allegation that "[b]rains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes" brings up (yet does not answer) an interesting question: what is a person, if not his/her brain?
"For a materialist, the brain always plays a causal role in behavior. Despite all the astonishing recent advances in neuroscience, however, we still know woefully little about how the brain enables the mind, and especially about how consciousness and intentionality can arise from the complicated hunk of matter that is the brain." (Quoting a slightly different version of this paper which appeared in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings (2010).) But the legal arguments need only demonstrate that "an agent’s capacity for rationality might be diminished by faulty neurotransmitters, psychological stress, trauma, or a host of other causes" (q, my emphasis) in order to argue that criminal responsibility for a particular action (which is based on certain presumptions of rationality) need not apply.
Morse's argument hinges around the idea of responsibility: an idea that was developed from and predicated on what we subjectively understand about our mental experiences. He argues that the correct perspective (and therefore also the correct use of neuroscience) is one which accepts the idea of responsibility (the internalist perspective). In contrast, an externalist perspective is based on the idea "determinism... is true or that our mental states play no role in explaining our behavior", and is therefore outside the current framework of our understanding of responsibility. In other words, the externalist perspective states that everything that we experience as human beings is essentially irrelevant in explaining our behavior. Morse argues (correctly, IMHO) that this perspective is inconsistent with the entire notion of responsibility.
Morse has written a fascinating and beautifully-nuanced argument in either source, and the real world-oriented humanist would do well to give some consideration to the question raised above: What is a person, if not simply his/her brain? I suspect that Morse never intended to answer that question, but rather only to illustrate that since our understanding of the brain is partial (one might even say minimal), a person should be judged by behavioral criteria of responsibility, rather than by what we think we may know about their brain. The use of neuroscientific 'evidence' should be used to support, rather than override, behavioral observations.
In the larger picture, the same can be said for other attempts to 'blame' behavior on various (usually oversimplified) aspects of genetics or environment. "Partial knowledge about causation does not mean that there is partial causation." Likewise, "[c]ausation cannot be an excuse per se for an internalist, who accepts responsibility, because all behavior is caused and thus all behavior would have to be excused." Morse, a determinist himself, believes that responsibility is compatible with determinism, however he defers the explanation of such compatibility to a realm other than science. "Science cannot resolve the dispute because the issue is metaphysical and normative and it is unlikely ever to be resolved by logic."
"As the biological and behavioral sciences offer ever more sophisticated understandings of normal and abnormal behavior alike, there will be constant pressure to use their findings to affect assessment of criminal responsibility and other legal doctrines. A lot will be at stake morally, politically and legally, and much will be debatable." I concur.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
The Good Shepherd (Pt II)
"And there is great power to be had by being the one to initiate a new order."
Our Fair State is currently awaiting the official results of yesterday's elections. And the results of the most high-profile race on the ballot - Supreme Court Judge - are close. Very close. (As of 11:40 AM, only 200 votes separate the candidates, with just one precinct not yet reporting. (via)) This race is viewed by many as a referendum on the recent right-wing power grab that involved a legislative attempt to take collective bargaining away from public employees.
In addition to shock and anger at the consequences of this "non-fiscal" budget repair bill, a sense of solidarity among workers of all kinds has emerged. What has not yet emerged in this situation is a single individual as the face/voice of the movement. There has been no 'Joe the plumber', no Joe Hill... and no Anton Drexler. Perhaps it is simply too early. Perhaps the outrage is still too fresh.
And perhaps it is naive to hope that this movement, this sense of solidarity and community, will continue uncorrupted. Eventually there will be an organized response, above and beyond attempts to recall current legislators or endorse candidates in races where the candidacy was already determined when the collective shit hit the fan. (Pardon the pun.)
Another episode in the ongoing series of weird coincidences that permeate my life began when I was in the library recently, looking for research material on workers' rights. While I didn't find what I was looking for in the area of workers' rights, as I perused the early-300s I did come across a book called Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, by journalist Robert D. Kaplan (2002). (If you know me, you know that that book was bound to go home with me.) It was a bit unsettling, given the current situation, to see sentence two of Chapter One - "The Nazi party began as a crusade for workers' rights organized by a Munich locksmith, Anton Drexler, in 1919, before Hitler took it over the following year." This sense of creepy coincidence developed further when I saw a published letter to the editor of a local news outlet this morning. The letter was a single line - "Ich bin ein pro-labor Wisconsinite." I have to wonder how many readers understood the significance of that letter. And I have to say, it probably would have gone right over my head had I not just been reading Kaplan's book.
As personal as the current situation in Our Fair State feels to me, and as much as it has pissed me into political activism, I also don't want our collective response to lose its sense of purity. Right now we are angry and in shock. Right now public employees are trying to figure out what to do if/when their take-home incomes are suddenly cut by $350 a month. Right now My City of 25,000 is poised to lose over 1000 years - years - of teaching experience as many public school teachers make the difficult decision to retire. (It shocked me too, but 30 teachers averaging 35 years each adds up.)
But it won't be long before the political interests involved find a face for the outraged masses to rally behind. And so we are forced to consider the first sentence of Kaplan's treatise - "The evils of the twentieth century arose from populist movements that were monstrously exploited in the name of utopian ideals, and had their power amplified by new technologies." Can there be a reasonable response to what has happened in Our Fair State and is happening in states across the country? Absolutely. Can it be an effective response without large-scale organization, financial resources, and leadership? I would love to believe that it's possible, but I have doubts...
One thing I have noticed in recent weeks is that people desperately want to be told who to vote for, and more generally, how to funnel their outrage. No one has time to do all the research themselves, they doubt their ability to 'get it right', and they are looking for a reliable source of information and direction. Here's just one example of a directive to the public that has gathered momentum, even though it may be only tangentially related to the average voter's actual source of ire. (I've also heard more than one person say that they'd like Russ Feingold to become the governor of Our Fair State.)
While emotions continue to run high, we the average voters also need to consider how to shape an effective political response to the actual issues, without getting lost in sentiment and rhetoric. We've seen what democracy looks like, but what will organized leadership look like? You turned out at the polls yesterday, far in excess of the 20% normally seen for this election. Don't lose your momentum; continue to demand the best from yourselves and any leaders you choose to follow!
Our Fair State is currently awaiting the official results of yesterday's elections. And the results of the most high-profile race on the ballot - Supreme Court Judge - are close. Very close. (As of 11:40 AM, only 200 votes separate the candidates, with just one precinct not yet reporting. (via)) This race is viewed by many as a referendum on the recent right-wing power grab that involved a legislative attempt to take collective bargaining away from public employees.
In addition to shock and anger at the consequences of this "non-fiscal" budget repair bill, a sense of solidarity among workers of all kinds has emerged. What has not yet emerged in this situation is a single individual as the face/voice of the movement. There has been no 'Joe the plumber', no Joe Hill... and no Anton Drexler. Perhaps it is simply too early. Perhaps the outrage is still too fresh.
And perhaps it is naive to hope that this movement, this sense of solidarity and community, will continue uncorrupted. Eventually there will be an organized response, above and beyond attempts to recall current legislators or endorse candidates in races where the candidacy was already determined when the collective shit hit the fan. (Pardon the pun.)
Another episode in the ongoing series of weird coincidences that permeate my life began when I was in the library recently, looking for research material on workers' rights. While I didn't find what I was looking for in the area of workers' rights, as I perused the early-300s I did come across a book called Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, by journalist Robert D. Kaplan (2002). (If you know me, you know that that book was bound to go home with me.) It was a bit unsettling, given the current situation, to see sentence two of Chapter One - "The Nazi party began as a crusade for workers' rights organized by a Munich locksmith, Anton Drexler, in 1919, before Hitler took it over the following year." This sense of creepy coincidence developed further when I saw a published letter to the editor of a local news outlet this morning. The letter was a single line - "Ich bin ein pro-labor Wisconsinite." I have to wonder how many readers understood the significance of that letter. And I have to say, it probably would have gone right over my head had I not just been reading Kaplan's book.
As personal as the current situation in Our Fair State feels to me, and as much as it has pissed me into political activism, I also don't want our collective response to lose its sense of purity. Right now we are angry and in shock. Right now public employees are trying to figure out what to do if/when their take-home incomes are suddenly cut by $350 a month. Right now My City of 25,000 is poised to lose over 1000 years - years - of teaching experience as many public school teachers make the difficult decision to retire. (It shocked me too, but 30 teachers averaging 35 years each adds up.)
But it won't be long before the political interests involved find a face for the outraged masses to rally behind. And so we are forced to consider the first sentence of Kaplan's treatise - "The evils of the twentieth century arose from populist movements that were monstrously exploited in the name of utopian ideals, and had their power amplified by new technologies." Can there be a reasonable response to what has happened in Our Fair State and is happening in states across the country? Absolutely. Can it be an effective response without large-scale organization, financial resources, and leadership? I would love to believe that it's possible, but I have doubts...
One thing I have noticed in recent weeks is that people desperately want to be told who to vote for, and more generally, how to funnel their outrage. No one has time to do all the research themselves, they doubt their ability to 'get it right', and they are looking for a reliable source of information and direction. Here's just one example of a directive to the public that has gathered momentum, even though it may be only tangentially related to the average voter's actual source of ire. (I've also heard more than one person say that they'd like Russ Feingold to become the governor of Our Fair State.)
While emotions continue to run high, we the average voters also need to consider how to shape an effective political response to the actual issues, without getting lost in sentiment and rhetoric. We've seen what democracy looks like, but what will organized leadership look like? You turned out at the polls yesterday, far in excess of the 20% normally seen for this election. Don't lose your momentum; continue to demand the best from yourselves and any leaders you choose to follow!
Monday, April 4, 2011
We Are One
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”
"On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, where he had gone to stand with sanitation workers demanding their dream: The right to bargain collectively for a voice at work and a better life. The workers were trying to form a union with AFSCME." (q)
(h/t)
"On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, where he had gone to stand with sanitation workers demanding their dream: The right to bargain collectively for a voice at work and a better life. The workers were trying to form a union with AFSCME." (q)
(h/t)
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